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REVIEW ESSAY
IT'S NOT THAT SIMPLE: AN UNNECESSARY
ELIMINATION OF STRICT LIABILITY AND
PRESUMED DAMAGES IN LIBEL LAW
A Chilling Effect. By Lois G. Forer. New York: W.W. Norton
& Company, Inc., 1987. Pp. 363. $18.95, cloth.
Reviewed by Alfred C. Yen*
Libel actions of one sort or another have wandered in and
out of vogue as methods for correcting perceived shortcomings
of the press.' During the middle of the twentieth century, libel
actions were unpopular in the United States. In 1947, Zechariah
Chafee, Jr. wrote that "a libelled American prefers to vindicate
his reputation by steadily pushing forward his career and not by
hiring a lawyer to talk in a courtroom."' Despite the recognition
by courts that libel actions could be used to curtail press activity,
libelous speech initially was devoid of first amendment protec-
tion.3 This apparent tranquility was shattered over the next forty
years.
In 1964 the Supreme Court decided the famous case of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.4 The Court held that traditional libel
actions by public officials violated the first amendment protec-
* B.S., M.S. Stanford University, J.D. Harvard Law School. Assistant Professor
of Law, Boston College Law School. The author would like to thank Dan Coquillette,
Jim Rodgers and Mark Brodin for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this review.
For a reading on the historical roots of libel, see J.H. Baker, An Introduction to
English Legal History (2d ed. 1979); 8 W.S. Holdsworth, History of English Law 333-
78 (1926).
2 Z. Chafee, Jr., I Government and Mass Communications 106-07 (1947).
3 See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
4 376 U.S. 254 (1964) [hereinafter New York Times].
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tion of free speech. Henceforth, public officials had to prove
that a defendant published the allegedly defamatory statements
with "actual malice in order to meet constitutional standards."
'5
However, while the constitutionalization of libel law in-
creased the plaintiff's burden of proof in certain actions, it did
not discourage plaintiffs from suing. Indeed, the number of libel
suits exploded during the next twenty years. Rather than
"steadily pushing forward" their careers, Americans began call-
ing their lawyers. 6 With its newfound popularity and constitu-
tional status, libel law moved to the forefront of public and
scholarly debate. This Review examines a recent chapter in the
debate, Judge Lois Forer's book A Chilling Effect.
7
Although New York Times was widely praised as a signifi-
cant advance in first amendment jurisprudence, 8 the constitu-
tional standards established in subsequent cases have proven
less than completely satisfactory. As a result, later cases have
attracted substantial criticism. 9
Perhaps more importantly, lower courts have encountered
difficulty in applying the standards of "public figure" and "actual
malice." One judge noted that "[d]efining a public figure is much
like trying to nail a jellyfish to a wall."10 The concept of actual
malice proved similarly troublesome. Although the standard was
meant to decrease the chilling effect of libel suits, experience
showed that the subjective nature of the actual malice test has
I Id. at 279-80.
6 See Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of
Libel, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1983).
7 Although Forer's book deals with many aspects of the relationship between in-
dividuals and the press, this review focuses primarily on Forer's treatment of actions
for defamatory falsehoods (generic libel). Space constraints preclude consideration here
of her more sweeping discussions of privacy, publicity and emotional distress.
8 See, e.g., Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning
of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191, 194 (1964). Effusively praising the
Court's decision, Kalven declared that New York Times was "an opinion that may prove
to be the best and most important it has ever produced in the realm of freedom of
speech."
9 E.g., Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of
Libel, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1983) ("The failure of first amendment jurisprudence to
bring new order to the law of defamation is in large part the result of the Court's
dismally mechanistic implementation of the compromise it established in Gertz."). See
also Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution: Confusion Amid Conflicting
Approaches, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 43 (1976).
I0 Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976)
(Lawrence, C.J.).
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led to costly and prolonged court battles-made all the worse
by the Supreme Court's refusal to curtail plaintiffs' discovery
rights." In fact, the very process of litigation has become as
threatening as the risk of damage awards.' 2
These difficulties have caused some commentators to sug-
gest that the legislatures, not the courts, should assume respon-
sibility for reforming modern libel doctrine. 3 Forer's book fol-
lows this trend by advocating the adoption of a federal libel
statute.
By Judge Forer's own admission, A Chilling Effect is "not
a legal text." (p. 25). She makes no attempt to survey relevant
doctrine or legal commentaries. Instead, her book is intended
to educate Americans and their elected representatives about
both the problems in existing libel law and the urgent need for
a libel statute. As a trial judge, Forer believes that her view of
libel law differs from that of the Supreme Court and other
commentators. (p. 21).
The result is a good effort to identify and explore problems
posed by the explosion of suits against the media. Forer rec-
ognizes that actions other than ordinary defamation can seri-
ously chill speech. As a result, her book broadly explores the
legal relationship between media organizations and their human
subjects. By identifying and describing problems in such areas
as invasion of privacy, rights of publicity and infliction of emo-
tional distress, Forer makes an effort that has not been made
by too many scholars, legislators and judges.'
4
1 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (chilling effect of discovery does not
justify restricting plaintiff's discovery rights).
12 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 867-69 (2d ed. 1988).
11 See Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 Calif. L.
Rev. 847 (1986); Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law,
74 Calif. L. Rev. 809 (1986); Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel
Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1 (1983); Hulme, Vindicating Reputation: An
Alternative to Damages as a Remedy for Defamation, 30 Am. U. L. Rev. 1382 (1977).
'4 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 56 U.S.L.W. 4180 (1988), illustrates
the implication of first amendment values in non-defamation actions. Defendant Hustler
magazine published a "parody," modeled after a nationally known advertisement, sug-
gesting that plaintiff television evangelist Falwell had engaged in a drunken incestuous
rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued, alleging invasion of privacy,
libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress. After a directed verdict for the
defendant on the invasion of privacy claim, the jury found no libel, but awarded the
plaintiff $100,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the jury award. 797 F.2d 1270 (1986), petition for
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Despite Forer's efforts, the book falls short of its stated
goal of educating lawmakers. Although Forer successfully iden-
tifies troublesome issues, she does not sufficiently clarify the
fundamental concepts that form the basis of those problems. In
particular, much of the book is devoted to making a case for
the adoption of a universal negligence standard in libel and the
elimination of presumed damages. Forer justifies her position
primarily by appealing to common sense; she contends that most
of the problems in libel doctrine can be cured by reconciling it
with principles of ordinary negligence law. This, however, is
based on the unarticulated assumption that ordinary negligence
law makes good sense. (pp. 71-72).
Unfortunately, things are not that simple. By uncritically
accepting ordinary negligence law as a model of good law, Forer
misses the opportunity to educate her reader about more basic
and fundamental choices which must be made by anyone re-
writing the law of libel. If Forer had examined the theories
behind the protection of reputation and speech, she would un-
doubtedly have discovered justifications for a strict liability libel
cause of action and the limited imposition of presumed damages.
Forer could also have arrived at the same justifications by con-
sidering the results of recent empirical research. By failing to
consider adequately either of these possibilities, Forer keeps
her reader from making a fully considered reevaluation of libel
law.
I. Describing the Problem
Forer fails to provide an orderly overview of modem libel
doctrine. 15 Such a summary, however, is necessary before one
can meaningfully evaluate her suggested reforms.
rel'g with suggestion for reh'g en banc denied, 804 F.2d 484 (1986). The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that Falwell, a public figure, could not recover for intentional infliction
of emotional distress absent a valid finding of defamation. 56 U.S.L.W. at 4182.
Although the decision may have broad implications for non-defamation suits against
the press, future decisions may limit its application to public figure plaintiffs, thereby
leaving private figures free to pursue similar claims. In addressing non-defamation
actions, Forer advocates the statutory creation of a right of "persona," which would
encompass rights of privacy, publicity and truthful depiction. (p. 42).
" Because she believes that libel law is fatally indeterminate, Forer describes libel
doctrine only when the description appears necssary to make her point that libel law
makes no sense. This major shortcoming makes it difficult to evaluate her proposals.
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Under the common law, libel was defined as a false state-
ment that held the plaintiff up to hatred, ridicule or contempt.
6
Traditionally, a false accusation of criminal activity, unchastity,
fraud or the like sufficed to create a defamation claim. If the
statement was defamatory, a defendant was held strictly liable
at common law for actual harm proven at trial by the plaintiff.'
7
The plaintiff also could receive a judgment for presumed dam-
ages, even if she had offered no evidence of actual harm. To
assess damages, the jury merely appraised the harshness of the
defamatory statement. 8 In addition, ajury could award punitive
damages if the defendant published the defamatory statement
with common law malice.' 9
In constitutionalizing libel law, the Supreme Court modified
the traditional doctrine. First, the Court reduced the liability of
defendants in certain cases. It held that a "public figure" plaintiff
could not recover without proof, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that the defendant had published the defamatory false-
hood with "actual malice. '20 "Actual malice" has been defined
in this context as "knowing or reckless disregard for falsity."'2'
A "private figure" plaintiff did not have to prove actual malice,
but instead could recover by demonstrating a defendant's fault.
22
Second, the Court changed the common law damage rules, pro-
hibiting the award of presumed or punitive damages unless the
plaintiff (whether public figure or private figure) proved actual
malice. 23 Because of these modifications, strict liability has been
eliminated, at least for the time being.24
Although such decisions as New York Times, Gertz and
their progeny were meant to protect the media from unwar-
16 See 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 3 (1970).
17 R. Smolla, Law of Defamation § 1.03[l] (1986).
"IId. at § 9.05[1].
19 Id. at § 9.08[3][b][ii].
20 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. This change was extended to so-called
"public figures" in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342.
21 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280.
2 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347; L. Tribe, supra note 12, at 874.
23 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. However, under the plurality opinion of Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), private plaintiffs can now recover
presumed and punitive damages without showing malice, if the defamatory speech is
not "of public concern." Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 758.
24 Although Gertz purported to abolish strict liability, the case of Dun & Bradstreet
suggests that the Court may retreat from its stance in Gertz. See infra note 56.
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ranted libel suits, Forer contends that in fact they have caused
the chilling effect that the Supreme Court had sought to prevent.
(pp. 17, 28-29).
She cites several cases to support her claim. In one, a
wealthy and prominent divorcee recovered $100,000 for a minor
inaccuracy in a news report of her divorce.25 In another, a
candidate for a United States Attorney appointment successfully
sued an individual who had written the President of the United
States to criticize the aspirant's performance. 26 By contrast, in
a third case, an incumbent mayor was denied recovery for a
newspaper's erroneous report that he had been indicted for
perjury.
27
Forer concludes that such inconsistent results render libel
law unintelligible. Plaintiffs with seemingly meritless cases re-
cover, while apparently defenseless publishers escape liability.
Such confusion, she asserts, creates incentives for plaintiffs to
sue, while offering little guidance to lawyers who must advise
their media clients whether to settle. Every plaintiff is tempted
to "stay in the race" on the chance of striking it rich. (pp. 21,
41). Even if a plaintiff's claim ultimately is found meritless, free
expression is chilled by the huge attorneys' fees and other costs
generated by the libel suit. (pp. 30-31).
What is worse, Forer argues, courts are helpless to remedy
the situation. (pp. 89-111, 111 n.16). Part of the problem is
constitutional: it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine ac-
curately who qualifies as a public figure. The complexity of libel
doctrine has compounded the quandary. It takes a judge two to
three hours simply to read instructions to the jury, which, Forer
says, are too complex for jurors to understand. (pp. 97-98).
Even if the judge manages to give intelligible instructions, the
abstract constitutional determinations - Who is a "public fig-
ure"? What is "actual malice"? - distract juries from the two
fundamental questions: Is the allegedly defamatory statement
true? Was the plaintiff harmed? (pp. 77-79, 111). Because of
15 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (erroneous report that divorce had
been granted on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery when grounds were extreme
cruelty and lack of domestication).
26 McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
27 Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
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these complexities and distractions, jury verdicts risk being
arbitrary.
Forer says these problems arise because libel doctrine is
counterintuitive, as opposed to ordinary negligence law, which
she apparently considers "intuitive." (p. 82). Under a negligence
regime, for example, a defendant's liability is not intended to
be punitive. Rather, damages are designed to "replace the losses
of the injured person, not to give a windfall or a bonus ......
(p. 80). In libel cases, however, presumed or punitive damages
allow juries to punish defendants and award windfall damages
to plaintiffs. Such verdicts lead plaintiffs to anticipate winning
large awards from deep-pocket media defendants regardless of
actual harm. As a result, says Forer, defendants are forced to
pay large sums in settlement even when they honestly think that
they have harmed no one. Citing several cases in which appar-
ently undeserving plaintiffs recovered substantial amounts de-
spite an inability to prove harm, (passim) Forer concludes that
the awarding of presumed damages in libel actions undermines
the proper goals of tort law. (pp. 81-82, 94-95).
Forer criticizes the actual malice standard in a similar man-
ner. Under ordinary negligence law, a plaintiff recovers if she
can demonstrate that the defendant has acted without due care.
By contrast, the actual malice standard permits recovery for
actual harm only when the defendant acted with reckless dis-
regard for the truth. Thus, Forer argues, the actual malice stan-
dard unacceptably operates to deny recovery to deserving plain-
tiffs. (pp. 79, 111).
II. Forer's Case for the Elimination of Presumed Damages
and the Adoption of a Universal Negligence Standard
Having presented the disarray in the house of libel, Forer
sets out to put that house in order. Not surprisingly, she believes
that a new regime, reconciling libel law with ordinary negligence
law, would create certainty, adequately protect reputation and
remove the chilling effect. (pp. 71-72, 95). These effects in turn
would hasten the process of libel litigation and simplify the
judge's task. (p. 95).
An essential element of her attempt to conform libel law to
ordinary negligence law is the adoption of a universal negligence
1988]
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standard. Under Forer's model statute, a public figure libel
plaintiff no longer would have to prove that the defendant acted
with actual malice; a showing of negligence would suffice.
(pp. 76-79, 340). Forer advances two justifications for this pro-
posal. First, because negligence is a familiar concept, plaintiffs
and defendants would understand their rights and obligations.
Courts also would find the test easier to apply. (p. 94). This
would promote certainty, expedite litigation and increase the
likelihood of a reasoned settlement.
Second, the adoption of a universal negligence standard
would eliminate the problematic constitutional public figure and
actual malice tests. (pp. 340-41). Under present doctrine, the
public figure test determines whether the actual malice standard
of liability applies. Forer proposes instead that negligence be
the standard of liability for all cases. By adding the uniform
damages standards described below, the need for the public
figure test would be eliminated. The results of this overhaul
would again be heightened certainty, smoother judicial admin-
istration and increased opportunities for settlement.
A second essential element of Forer's proposal is the elim-
ination of presumed damages. Under her suggested statute,
compensatory money damages would be available only for harm
actually proven to have been caused by the defendant's negli-
gence. Punitive damages would be awarded only upon a showing
of "personal spite or ill will." (p. 331). Once again, she cites
ease of judicial application as her goal. First, eliminating pre-
sumed damages would reduce a plaintiff's incentives to sue,
increase her incentives to settle and thereby hasten the pro-
cessing of litigation. (pp. 99, 111). Furthermore, "U]uries would
have the usual criteria by which to measure damages. Trial
judges would also be able to exercise their usual function of
remitting damages in excess of what was proved. Trial and
appellate judges would have a sound basis by which to measure
the fairness of the verdict." (p. 354).
Taken together, Forer's proposals seem to constitute a
seemingly convincing case for the adoption of a universal neg-
ligence standard and the elimination of presumed damages.
However, things are not as simple as Forer imagines them. A
closer examination of the reasons for protecting reputation and
speech reveals a strong case for the adoption of a strict liability
A Chilling Effect
cause of action for libel that would allow limited presumed
damages. By failing to embark on this inquiry, Forer misses the
opportunity to educate her reader about the fundamental choice
inherent in her proposal.
28
The next section of this Review describes this neglected
line of inquiry. It begins by considering recent empirical and
theoretical scholarship. This leads to an examination of libel
remedies other than money damages and the standards of lia-
bility which are appropriate for those remedies. A case for strict
liability in libel and the limited imposition of presumed damages
follows.
III. A Case for a Strict Liability Cause of Action in Libel
"The law [historically] treats reputation as a property right
that is balanced against the First Amendment claims of the
author," says Forer. Because of this, "[t]he remedy for damage
to reputation, like the remedy for damage to any other property
interest, [is] an award of money." (p. 113). For Forer, this prop-
osition is not enough. She finds it "unnecessary to discuss the
juridical theories and precedents for granting recovery to sub-
jects who sue for defamation."29 (p. 114) This assumption un-
derlies her claim that presuming damages as a normal conse-
quence of harm to reputation does not make sense.30 (p. 114).
In light of Forer's concern over judicial and academic
butchering of libel law, her uncritical acceptance of reputation
as property is strange. Even stranger is the length to which she
goes to endow reputation with property-like traits. In several
places, Forer states that it is probably unconstitutional to elim-
inate certain recoveries for harm to reputation. Such changes in
the law purportedly violate due process prohibitions against the
taking of property without just compensation. (p. 201). While
reputation does have property-like traits, it deserves protection
for reasons beyond its economic value.
2 This choice is to treat reputations as a property right. See infra text accompanying
note 30.
29 Forer attacks the assumption only by arguing that harm to reputation does not
necessarily lead to loss of property.
0 For further development of the theory behind Forer's position, see infra note 39.
1988]
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Support for this proposition comes from both empirical and
theoretical scholarship. In Phase I of the Iowa Libel Research
Project, Professors Bezanson, Cranberg and Soloski inter-
viewed more than 150 libel plaintiffs and defendants in an at-
tempt to determine why they sue. 31 Contrary to Forer's apparent
belief that most plaintiffs sue out of a desire to strike it rich, the
study found that plaintiffs' three primary motivations are non-
financial: restoring reputation, correcting falsity and achieving
vengeance. Only 20% of the plaintiffs brought suit to recover
damages for economic harm. 32 Indeed, plaintiffs apparently
viewed the very act of bringing suit as vindicating their repu-
tations.3 3 Interviews with media defendants confirmed the
study's findings with regard to the motivations of plaintiffs.
Defendants perceived that the majority of plaintiffs seek vindi-
cation and punishment, not compensation.
34
Professor Bezanson found support for the primacy of non-
financial motives to sue in the fact that plaintiffs face extremely
poor prospects for victory or significant recovery.35 Of the plain-
tiffs interviewed, 86.5% stated that they would sue again. Sur-
prisingly, even of the plaintiffs who lost and said the suit accom-
plished nothing, 80% claimed they would sue again. 36 From
these responses, it is evident that plaintiffs do not view money
as the remedy for harm to their reputations. Indeed, the will-
ingness to sue again despite initial failure indicates that plaintiffs
feel their reputation is worth protecting even if no money can
be recovered.
11 Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs
Get, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 789 (1986); Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation:
Setting the Record Straight, 71 Iowa L. Rev 226 (1985). See also Franklin, Suing the
Media in Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 795; Franklin, Winners
and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J.
455.
1, Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record Straight,
supra note 31, at 228.
3 Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs
Get, supra note 31, at 792.
m See Cranberg, Fanning the Fire: The Media's Role in Libel Litigation, 71 Iowa
L. Rev. 221 (1985).
3 The rate of plaintiff success by judgment is less than 10%. Another 10% recover
some money through settlement. Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs
Want and What Plaintiffs Get, supra note 31, at 790-91 nn.3-4.
36 Id. at 797.
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A similar conclusion can be drawn from a theoretical per-
spective. Robert C. Post has examined three distinct concepts
of reputation worthy of protection: as property, as honor and
as dignity.37 Post explains each of these concepts and shows
how each has influenced libel doctrine.
The first of these notions corresponds to Forer's accepted
premise:
[R]eputation can be understood as a form of intangible
property akin to goodwill. It is this concept of reputa-
tion that underlies our image of the merchant who
works hard to become known as creditworthy or of the
carpenter who strives to achieve a name for quality
workmanship. Such a reputation is capable of being
earned, in the sense that it can be acquired as a result
of an individual's efforts and labor.
38
According to Post, the concept of reputation as property pre-
sumes the existence of a marketplace that values reputation.
Defamation law thus ensures that individuals are not wrongfully
deprived of reputational value earned in the marketplace.
39
The second notion, reputation as honor, is based on the
individual's social role.40 Under this theory, the individual's
reputation does not depend either on her efforts or on market
forces. Instead, reputation comes to the individual by reason of
her station. Thus, for example, royalty enjoys a "good" repu-
tation merely by being noble, not by reason of hard work or
good deeds. 4
1
If reputation is seen as honor, then libel law
must define and enforce the ascribed status of social
roles.... [This] function was epitomized in the law of
seditious libel, which punished as a crime any speech
37 Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Consti-
tution, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 691 (1986) [hereinafter Post].
38 Id. at 693.
39 Id. at 695.
40 Id. at 699-700.
41 Id. at 700.
1988]
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"that may tend to lessen [the King] in the esteem of
his subjects, may weaken his government, or may raise
jealousies between him and his people. '42
The third notion, reputation as dignity, is based on the "essential
dignity and worth of every human being. ' 43 This dignity is "the
respect (and self-respect) that arises from full membership in
society." 44 In other words, an individual's sense of self is deter-
mined in large part by how others perceive and treat her. Under
this theory, libelous statements tend to ostracize people from
society. Defamation law seeks to protect individual dignity, to
prevent wrongful dislocation from society and to enforce a code
of civility.4
5
Each of these conceptions of reputation implies a different
form of libel law. A theory of reputation as property leads to a
conception of libel not unlike Forer's. If reputation is an intan-
gible asset valued by the marketplace, awarding money damages
for reputational harm makes sense. Because the form of harm
can be proved by reference to the marketplace, presumed dam-
ages are nonsensical under a reputation as property theory.46
(p.80-82).
On the other hand, when reputation is seen as something
other than an income-producing asset, money damages seem
less appropriate. 47 How can any sum of money be equated with
the loss of a person's place in the larger community? Awarding
money damages in such situations constitutes pure
speculation.48
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the need for a libel
remedy other than pure money damages. As discussed above,
empirical studies have shown that plaintiffs primarily are con-
cerned about vindication. This theory leads to the same conclu-
42 Id. at 702 (quoting 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 123).
43 Id. at 707 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
4Id. at 711.
45 Id. at 709-11.
46 Id. at 695-99.
47 As noted above, reputation as honor is manifested most clearly in seditious libel
doctrine. However, because New York Times found this version of defamation uncon-
stitutional, this Review focuses instead on the concept of reputation as dignity.
48 Post, supra note 37, at 703, 713.
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sion: reputation is worth protecting because it protects the in-
dividual's place in society. Both analyses suggest the need for
a libel remedy focusing not on compensation but on the resto-
ration of the individual. Two such remedies come to mind:
declaratory judgment and retraction.
A declaratory judgment would give the successful plaintiff
a judicial declaration of the falsity of the defamatory publica-
tion.49 A retraction, by contrast, would require the defendant to
correct the errors made. For example, a libelous front page,
banner headline accusation of theft would demand a front page,
banner headline retraction.50 If the defamation were committed
privately, corrections would be sent to all who read or heard
the defamatory statement.5' No compensation for pecuniary loss
or emotional harm would be awarded in either case.
52
The proposed retraction remedy cannot completely replace
money damages. Libel can cause very real pecuniary loss. A
lawyer falsely accused of fraud, for example, may lose a sub-
stantial portion of her practice. The additional imposition of
money damages remains a powerful tool to discourage undesir-
able forms of activity (such as willful dissemination of false-
hood). For this reason, restorative remedies should coexist with
money damages.
5 3
49 See Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74
Calif. L. Rev. 809 (1986); Hulme, supra note 13; Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law:
A Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, supra note 13.
10 Others have hinted at this remedy. See Post, supra note 37 at 730 n.206; Lebel,
Defamation and the First Amendment: The End of the Affair, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
779, 788 (1984). To the extent that a defendant is required to act affirmatively, a
retraction is more drastic. Note, however, that the broad dissemination of the correction
ensures that many more people will be informed of the defendant's error.
Concerns that Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), renders
such proposals unconstitutional are unwarranted. Tornillo tested a statute that created
a compulsory right of reply when no defamation had occurred. The case does not stand
for the proposition that a defendant cannot be forced to retract a defamatory statement
after a verdict has been reached. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional
Law 932 (1983).
51 For our purposes, the choice of restorative remedies is not important. What is
important is the shift in emphasis from compensation (money damages) to restoration,
which greatly reduces the chilling effect of libel actions. Declaratory judgments and
retraction are outlined here to give the reader concrete examples of the types of
restorative remedies which are available.
-2 As discussed below, presumed damages would be recoverable, but not upon the
theory of compensating pecuniary loss or emotional suffering.
51 Election of remedies has been suggested by several commentators. Some advo-
cate election by the plaintiff. For example, plaintiffs might be encouraged to choose a
1988]
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With two conceptually distinct libel remedies created, the
next step is to decide what standard of liability is to be required
for the imposition of each remedy. This inquiry can be answered
by a detailed analysis of the reasons for limiting libel suits. As
discussed below, retraction remedies may be appropriately ap-
plied on a strict liability basis, whereas money damages should
be awarded only on a showing of greater fault.
The rationale for shielding the media from libel suits stems
from the media's role in the flow of truthful information. Absent
protection, the risk of huge judgments and the cost of litigation
would deter the media from spreading information and thus
would chill speech. Therefore, some tolerance of falsehoods is
necessary to preserve the dissemination of truth. 54 In this light,
the consequences of restoration and money damages become
very different.
When the putative libel defendant considers printing a pos-
sibly defamatory statement, she must weigh the possibility of
costly litigation and a huge judgment. For a small newspaper, a
single multimillion dollar judgment can be fatal. Thus, a pub-
lisher must continually decide whether or not to bet her printing
press by publishing a particular statement. The danger of being
proven wrong alone is not what chills the publisher's expression.
Rather, it is the likely consequence of being proven wrong-the
loss of money-that creates the chill. By contrast, if the news-
paper's only risk were public admission of an error, editors and
publishers would likely agonize less about printing sensitive
stories.
The foregoing analysis implies a sharp dichotomy. Money
damages effectively chill the exercise of speech, while restora-
tion (public admission or declaration of error) does not. Because
one should be less hesitant to impose restoration remedies than
declaratory judgment rather than damages by eliminating punitive damages, introducing
fee shifting and augmenting the plaintiff's burden of proof. See Franklin, A Declaratory
Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, supra note 13, at 812-13. Others have
suggested giving defendants the right to elect remedies when the harm is unidentifiable.
Defendants would have the option of selecting a remedy of repair in lieu of money
damages. See Lebel, supra note 50, at 788-90. Some argue that plaintiff's election
should be irrevocable. See, e.g., Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of
Libel Law and a Proposal, supra note 13, at 43.
5 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72.
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money damages, separate standards of liability for the two rem-
edies should be created.
A restoration remedy should be imposed on a strict liability
basis. The plaintiff need only convince the court that the state-
ment is false and defamatory for liability to attach. No showing
of negligence or other fault would be required. 55 The proposed
strict liability standard is justified for two main reasons. First,
restoration is justified even if the defendant is not culpable
because restoration focuses on helping the injured victim, not
on punishing the defendant.
Second, restoration is not punitive and does not chill
speech, even when applied to a faultless defendant. Where
money damages are concerned, libel defendants can claim plau-
sibly that strict liability is punitive because damage awards harm
those engaged in an honest effort to disseminate truthful infor-
mation. Where money damages cannot be awarded, however,
the argument loses force. No libel defendant who seriously
seeks the truth can honestly claim that she has been punished
by merely being forced to correct or admit a mistake. Indeed,
restoration furthers the very values promoted by the protection
of media defendants. By setting the record straight, restoration
promotes the dissemination of truth.
By contrast, money damages should attach only upon proof
of some fault on the part of the defendant. As the Supreme
Court has spoken clearly in this area, for purposes of this Re-
view it makes sense to adopt the two tier system of fault adopted
by the Court. Under this system, the degree of fault would
depend on the identity of the plaintiff. Public figure plaintiffs
would have to show actual malice in order to recover. Private
figure plaintiffs would only have to prove "fault. ' 56
15 This cause of action is not intended to alter the meaning of a defamatory state-
ment. The point is only that defendants will be strictly liable in defamation for
retractions.
56 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 347 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985). This is not intended to be an endorsement of the Court's adopted doctrine. In
the author's view, the rigidity and detail of existing constitutional requirements rob the
states of the flexibility required to reform libel laws effectively.
Gertz, for example, is generally read to prevent states from imposing liability
without fault in defamation cases. As such, it prevents states from offering remedies to
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The purpose of the twin causes of action is the following.
As long as the publisher of a defamatory statement acts reason-
ably, the primary risk she assumes is that of being forced to
admit the error publicly. The only possible loss is one of future
printing costs. 57 However, if the publisher does not act reason-
ably, she assumes the greater risk of liability for all damages
caused by the defamatory statement.
IV. The Case for Limited Presumed Damages
If a cause of action for restoration has been accepted, the
case for limited imposition of presumed damages would follow
naturally. The need for presumed damages flows from a consid-
eration of how restoration operates.
Restoration is a prospective remedy. It makes the plaintiff
whole only from the date of the restoration. It does nothing to
improve the plaintiff's reputation during the period that the
defamatory falsehood goes uncorrected. In addition, the pros-
pect of restoration without the threat of money damages gives
the defendant no incentive to correct any errors once a suit has
been brought. If the worst that can befall the defendant is a
public correction of the false story, there is little reason to print
any correction voluntarily. 58 Finally, there is the oft stated prob-
lem that the truth "never catches up with a lie." Some who have
read or heard the defamatory statement will never learn that it
was false. 5
9
all who have been harmed by defamatory speech. Thus, under the usual reading of
Gertz, the strict liability retraction remedy would be unconstitutional.
Such a result makes no sense because the chilling effect of a retraction remedy is
significantly less than that of money damages and the remedy furthers first amendment
values because it assists in the dissemination of accurate information.
The Court should modify present doctrine to allow the imposition of strict liability
when the chilling effect of money damages is sharply limited. At the time of this writing,
such a change may already be on its way. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenioss
Builders, Inc., the Court held that private plaintiffs need not prove actual malice to
recover presumed or punitive damages if the defamatory statement was not a matter of
public concern. This decision, which included two concurring opinions urging the re-
versal of Gertz, indicates that the Court may be willing to reconsider its position on
strict liability in defamation. See Franklin, Suing the Media in Libel: A Litigation Study,
supra note 31, at 819-21.
57 Litigation costs remain, but can be alleviated by awarding attorneys' fees.
-8 By contrast, the huge award available in a conventional money damages action
provides a powerful incentive to ,settle.
19 R. Smolla, Law of Defamation § 9.12 (1986).
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Presumed damages offer a solution to these problems.
Awarding presumed damages provides reasonable compensa-
tion for the intangible harm done to the plaintiff pending resto-
ration and for the necessary incompleteness of the restoration
remedy. Furthermore, presumed damages give the defendant
some incentive to behave responsibly in deciding whether to
retract voluntarily, and therefore enhance the likelihood of
settlement.
Of course, the unlimited imposition of presumed damages
would be a dangerous development. As Forer and others have
pointed out, presumed damages give juries the opportunity to
impose large unwarranted verdicts.60 To remedy this, legisla-
tures should pass statutes to limit awards of presumed dam-
ages. 6' Such an approach would prevent runaway juries while




The above analysis has sought to demonstrate the major
shortcoming of A Chilling Effect. Although Forer correctly iden-
tifies many problems in libel law, she fails to give her reader the
background necessary to guide an intelligent restructuring of the
law. It is not sufficient to identify the undesirable consequences
of modem libel law, accept negligence law as the manifestation
of common sense and then revise libel doctrine to conform with
negligence doctrine.
As sections III and IV have shown, legislators cannot be
confident in their adoption of any libel statute unless the most
basic assumptions surrounding the protection of reputation and
60 See Gertz, 388 U.S. at 349.
61 A reasonable limit might be $200 a day, with a maximum total award of $20,000.
There is support for the constitutionality of such a proposal. See Dun & Bradstreet,
472 U.S. at 771 (White, J., concurring).
6- The reader may have suggestions for improving or criticizing the proposed re-
traction cause of action. Among the possibilities are the award of attorneys' fees and
election of remedies by the plaintiff or defendant. Since the purpose of this Review is
to indicate the shortcomings of Forer's approach to educating our legislatures, the
elaboration of these ideas is left to others. See, e.g., Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment
Alternative to Current Libel Law, supra note 13; Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for
Libel: A Better Alternative, supra note 13; Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A
Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, supra note 13.
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speech are examined. If legislators simply followed Forer's no-
tion of remodeling along negligence lines, they would fail to
debate the merits of alternative conceptions of reputation or the
implications of empirical research. In addition, the case for a
strict liability restoration cause of action and the limited impo-
sition of presumed damages would be ignored. Such an unin-
formed choice would not represent legislative decisionmaking
at its best.
Such criticism does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that Forer's proposal should not be adopted. Rather, the pur-
pose of this Review has been to demonstrate that the adoption
of Forer's proposal-without considering or rebutting models
such as the one presented here-would be ill informed. Such
legislative action runs the risk of being no more than the "blun-
dering process of trial and error" that Forer rightfully criticizes.
(p. 43). Such lawmaking risks creating rules that are even more
confusing than current libel doctrine.
This Review began by noting the increasing prominence of
modem libel litigation. Using A Chilling Effect as a starting
point, the Review then explored how theoretical and empirical
research can contribute to solving the doctrinal problems that
exist. This exploration, however, is only a starting point.
Even if ordinary defamation law is improved, the tension
between individuals and the press will continue. Cases such as
Hustler Magazine v. Falwel 63 illustrate that the battlefield may
already be shifting from libel to other tort causes of action.
Thus, simply repairing libel doctrine may not be enough to
prepare the legal system for future disputes.
If Forer and others are right in asserting that legislatures,
and not the courts, are the proper institutions for resolving the
conflict between individuals and the press, then the legislatures
should be urged to consider all legal doctrines that can be used
to chill free speech. In doing so, the legislatures must make use
of the type of inquiry undertaken here. Unless they consider
empirical evidence and basic theoretical concepts of reputation,
legislatures will be unable to carry on the informed debate nec-
essary to create effective change in the libel law.
6, 108 S. Ct. 876, 56 U.S.L.W. 4180 (1988).
